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Conditional Conservatism and the Cost of Equity Capital: 
Informational, Fundamental, and Behavioral Effects 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Conditional conservatism (CON) is related to the cost of equity capital in a 
complex way, especially in imperfect markets. Prior literature suggests that CON affects the 
information precision and information asymmetry, resulting in either increased or decreased cost 
of equity. In addition, CON may influence firms’ investment decisions and exacerbate their 
fundamental operating risks, and investors are asymmetrically loss-averse to more bad earnings 
news reporting via conservative disclosure, both of which contribute to a higher equity cost. This 
paper empirically examines the impact of CON on the cost of equity capital through these 
informational, fundamental and behavioral risk effects, and detects a significantly positive 
association between CON and equity cost by adopting accounting-based CON proxies and equity 
cost measures adjusted for unexpected cash flow shocks. Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
as a natural experiment, we find that the positive CON-equity cost relation disappears in the 
post-SOX period, consistent with diminished informational, operational, and behavioral risk 
effects engendered by SOX regulations.  
 
Keywords: conditional conservatism; cost of equity capital; asset pricing tests; Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX). 
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I. Introduction 
Conditional conservatism (CON hereafter) is a salient feature of financial reporting that 
reflects a firm’s commitment to timely bad earnings news disclosure.1  CON’s extensive 
economic impact on accounting information has been well-documented in the literature and is 
essential to the decision making of both investors and firm managers. CON’s role in affecting 
firms’ cost of equity capital, however, has not been well-established. This paper posits to 
empirically examine on the association between CON and the cost of equity and provide insights 
into how investors’ and firms’ reactions to conservative disclosure contribute to the CON-equity 
cost relation. 
Prior studies suggest that one major channel through which CON affects firms’ cost of 
equity capital is information risk, including information quality (or precision) and information 
asymmetry, with general consensus that better information quality and less information 
asymmetry decrease firms’ cost of capital, ceteris paribus. A strand of analytical research 
demonstrates that accounting conservatism improves the overall quality of information via 
providing more accurate signal to mitigate the payoff loss due to conservative bias (Fan and 
Zhang 2011), alleviating dysfunctional earnings manipulation (Chen et al. 2007), limiting the 
probability of bad firms obtaining high signals and reducing their free-riding benefits (Nan and 
Wen 2011), or encouraging full disclosure through more voluntarily convey of timely good news 
(Guay and Verrecchia 2007). There is, however, no unanimous agreement regarding the 
information asymmetry effect of accounting conservatism. Some studies do not specifically 
differentiate information asymmetry and information quality (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 
                                                 
1
 As guidance, the FASB’s Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 (1980, para. 95) intones that “if two estimates of 
amounts to be received or paid in the future are about equally likely, conservatism dictates using the less optimistic estimate.” 
The Accounting Principles Board (Statement No. 4 1970, para. 171) observes that “managers, investors, and accountants have 
generally preferred that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net 
income and net assets. This has led to the convention of conservatism.” 
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1991), or assume better quality disclosure reduces information asymmetry via decreasing the 
information advantage of sophisticated investors (Botosan 2006; Francis et al. 2004), or argue 
more disclosure improves risk-sharing across generations of investors (Suijs 2008). In contrast, 
other studies including Gow et al. (2011) and Lambert et al. (2012) suggest that publicly reported 
earnings information is a complement to the private information held by sophisticated investors, 
and a more precise disclosure may increase heterogeneity of opinions among market participants 
and make them more dissimilarly informed, thus enhancing information asymmetry. This is 
consistent with the evidence from Biddle et al. (2011) that loan charge-offs mandated by 
impairment rules increase a financial firm's contribution to systemic risk by elevating 
information asymmetry among mangers and stakeholders of other banks and Haggard et al. 
(2011) that large asset write-downs also increase information asymmetry.  
Therefore, how CON affects equity cost through the information channel results from the 
combined influence of information precision and information asymmetry. The two effects, 
however, play different roles in different settings. In classical competitive noisy rational 
expectations economy, there is no cross-sectional effect of information asymmetry on cost of 
capital, implying that only average information quality (precision) can be priced by the investors 
(Hughes et al. 2007; Lambert et al. 2012).2 On the other hand, when competition is imperfect 
and markets are illiquid, asymmetric information can significantly affect the cost of capital even 
after controlling for information precision (Lambert et al. 2012, Lambert and Verrecchia 2010). 
This argument is supported by empirical findings from Akins et al. (2011), Armstrong et al. 
(2011), and Gow et al. (2011) who establish that information asymmetry can affect incrementally 
                                                 
2
 For example, Hughes et al. (2007) indicate that the pricing of asymmetric information as claimed by Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
in a competitive market is a “misperception” and only information asymmetry about systematic factors affects factor 
(market-wide) risk premiums. 
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firms’ cost of capital when the market for the firms’ shares is less than perfectly competitive.3 
The above analyses and evidence suggest that CON may be associated with a lower cost of 
equity by increasing the information precision and thus decreasing total information risk when 
markets are efficient with perfect competition and liquidity, since in such markets there is no 
information asymmetry effect. When markets are not perfect, which is likely in practice, if the 
more precise earnings information via conservative disclosure attenuates information asymmetry, 
the cost of equity will be further reduced; if earning precision exacerbates information 
asymmetry, then more asymmetric information leads to higher cost of equity which offsets the 
lower equity cost due to improved information quality, with the combined effect undetermined 
analytically.   
Conservative disclosure not only affects investors’ decision making through the information 
channel, but also influence firms’ production or investment efficiency, and thus fundamental 
operational risk, with less efficiency and more fundamental risk being associated with higher 
cost of equity. Analytically, Gao (2010) demonstrates that disclosure quality (via CON) could 
increase cost of capital when new investment is sufficiently elastic via increasing the overall risk 
of firms’ cash flow. Gao and Liang (2011) show that the “leveled play field” by more disclosure 
(e.g., more public information from conservative reporting) impedes firms’ investment efficiency 
via dampening information producing by speculators in the market.4 Similarly, Lambert et al. 
(2007) suggest that higher quality disclosures from CON affect a firm’s real decisions with 
respect to production or investment, which further change the impact of expected cash flow on 
                                                 
3
 Akins et al. (2011), Armstrong et al. (2011), and Gow et al. (2011) also find information asymmetry does not affect the cost of 
equity incremental to market risk if firms’ stocks are traded in highly liquid and competitive markets. 
4
 Gao and Liang’s (2011) model is developed from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who demonstrate that “there is a fundamental 
conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread information and the incentives to acquire information.” The intuition 
is that more disclosure discourages private information acquisition by speculators, and the speculators’ information set is not a 
subset of the firm’s and is reflected via asset prices. Preemptive disclosure thus reduces stock price informativeness to the firm, 
leading to misallocation of resources and investment inefficiency. 
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covariance risk and hence influence the firm’s cost of capital. If improved information quality 
makes managers more aggressive in investment choice, the resulting misallocation (i.e., 
inefficiency) may cause a higher equity cost. Conditional conservatism also more directly affects 
cost of equity via revised perceptions of risk embedded in firms’ fundamentals. CON induces 
reported earnings numbers to timely reflect more pessimistic estimates, which increases earnings 
downside risk and enhances its ability to capture fundamental operating risk. As empirically 
shown by Luo et al. (2011), higher earnings downside risk (especially accrual downside risk) is 
associated with higher cost of equity capital (stock’s expected returns). Thus, conditional 
conservatism may affect the cost of equity capital by indirectly influencing firms’ real 
investment decisions and directly conveying downside risk inherent in firms’ operations. 
In imperfect markets, conditional conservatism may further affect cost of equity by 
engendering behaviorally-motivated mispricing. As advocated by FASB’s Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 (1980, para. 95), one major function of CON is to convey 
bad earnings news in a timely manner. By conception, CON reports income-decreasing events 
with a downward bias, i.e., earnings losses are revealed with larger magnitude and more 
frequency than the true economic earnings. With the existence of information inefficiency, 
investors may have asymmetrically stronger reactions to bad earnings news conveyed by 
conditional conservatism than to good news, exhibiting loss aversion as suggested by Roy (1952), 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and Veronesi (1999). Such an effect can be further enhanced as 
frequent biased loss reporting induces investors to face more ambiguity and adopt shorter 
horizons, thus heightening the ambiguity aversion (Epstein and Schneider 2008) and myopic loss 
aversion (Benartzi and Thaler 1985). These behavioral influences lead to a higher perceived risk 
by investors which causes them to require a higher compensation when providing equity funds, 
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i.e., an increased cost of equity to the firm. 
In summary, literature suggests that conditional conservatism is related to the cost of equity 
capital in a complex way, especially in imperfect markets where the information asymmetry, 
fundamental operational risk, and behavioral influences may add an equity cost increasing effect 
which counterbalances the cost decreasing effect of improved information quality by CON, 
leaving the overall CON-equity cost relation an empirical issue. Existing empirical studies on 
this issue, however, are limited and mostly conducted under implicit assumption of efficient 
market, i.e., assuming equity price reflects all publicly available information correctly and in a 
timely manner. For example, using stock price’s asymmetric response to good and bad earnings 
news as a proxy for conditional conservatism (Basu 1997), Francis et al. (2004) find that CON 
has no significant association with the cost of equity. Lara et al. (2011) construct a conditional 
conservatism measure within the framework of Callen et al. (2010), which is also a market 
price-based conservatism metric, and show that it significantly reduces cost of equity capital. 
Both studies explain the findings from the perspective of information risk, i.e., CON induces less 
uncertainty in information which lowers the equity cost. This is mainly an information quality 
(precision) effect as demonstrated above. The effects of information asymmetry, investor loss 
aversion, and fundamental operation risk, however, are largely constrained in the frameworks of 
these studies (i.e., the adopted CON measures are designed under the assumption of 
informationally efficient market with perfect competition implication).5 Since all these three 
effects have the potential to increase equity cost, the cost of equity capital for firms with more 
conservative reporting may become higher if the influences from information asymmetry, 
investor behavior, and fundamental risk are considered, which, if strong enough, may even 
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 Other market-based CON measures, for example, the C-score in Khan and Watts (2008), also have the same implicit 
assumption of market efficiency and competition perfection. 
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dominate the information precision effect and result in a positive CON-equity cost relation. 
However, no study has explicitly examined this issue so far in the literature. 
This paper is thus motivated to investigate the relation between conditional conservatism 
and the cost of equity capital through the abovementioned information asymmetry, behavioral, 
and fundamental effects, which represent the aspects of conditional conservatism that may 
potentially increase equity cost. To this end, we must relax the market efficiency and perfect 
competition assumption. This implies that it is necessary to disentangle the conditional 
conservatism and cost of capital measures from the impacts of stock market information and cash 
flow shocks since we no longer assume market price is a timely and correct reflection of good or 
bad earnings news revealed by CON. For example, equity price observed in imperfect markets 
may have endogenously incorporated the effects of information risk (especially information 
asymmetry), its feedback on firms’ investment and fundamental operations, and potential 
mispricing. In order to examine how conditional conservatism influences the cost of equity 
through these effects, the CON measure has to be free from using market-based data to avoid 
mechanically induced endogeneity problem. Therefore, in this study, we employ accounting 
information to construct a proxy for conditional conservatism as the average of accumulated 
non-operational accrual and relative earnings skewness, following Givoly and Hyan (2000) and 
Zhang (2008). This accounting-based measure more directly reflects bad news conveyed to 
market participants by conditionally conservative disclosure which helps provide clearer 
inferences not only regarding the information asymmetry and behavioral effects driven by 
market activities, but also about the operational risk effects driven by firms’ fundamentals. With 
the same spirit, we control for the effect of cash flow shocks on estimated equity cost since 
conservative treatment like large accrual expense (which increases CON measure) may at the 
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same time reflect unexpected negative shocks to future cash flows (which decrease the realized 
stock returns), resulting in a noisy cost of equity measure and a potential mechanical negative 
relation between CON and equity cost. To factor out the disturbance of unexpected cash flow 
shocks, we adopt an ex ante cost of equity capital measure as realized excess return adjusted for 
cash flow news, as suggested by Vuolteenaho (2002), McInnis (2010), Ogneva (2010), and 
Botosan et al (2011).6  
We conduct empirical examinations on the relation between accounting-based conditional 
conservatism measure and cash flow news adjusted cost of equity proxy by utilizing standard 
asset pricing tests that include hedging portfolio analyses and multivariate regressions, while 
controlling for industry effects as suggested by Lewellen et al. (2010). Using a sample of 62,833 
U.S. firm-year observations for the period of January 1986 to December 2008, we document a 
significant positive relation between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital, 
suggesting the equity cost enhancing effects of conditional conservatism generated from 
information asymmetry, investor loss aversion, and higher fundamental downside risk exhibit a 
dominating power in influencing firms’ cost of equity. In particular, a hedging strategy for 
CON-sorted portfolios earns significantly positive cash flow new adjusted excess returns. Firm 
level Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions yield significantly positive associations between 
conditional conservatism and future excess returns adjusted for cash flow news, with and without 
controlling for firm risk characteristics. Portfolio level two-stage cross-sectional regressions 
reveal conservatism factor loadings to be significantly positively associated with return spreads 
for CON-sorted portfolios, implying that conditional conservatism is priced by market 
participants.   
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 Botosan et al. (2011) and Ogneva (2010) argue that cash flow news does not cancel out in large samples, thus asset pricing tests 
may induce biases when future realized returns are used to proxy for expected returns.                 
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We present supporting evidence regarding the information asymmetry, behavioral, and 
fundamental downside risk effects on the relation between conditional conservatism and cost of 
equity. Portfolio analyses indicate that larger CON is generally associated with higher 
information asymmetry and higher earnings downside risk. Controlling for information 
asymmetry and/or earnings downside risk in Fama-MacBeth regressions substantially reduces 
the coefficients for CON, i.e., information asymmetry and fundamental downside risk largely 
subsume the positive CON-equity cost relation. Hedging portfolio analyses reveal that 
significantly positive returns to CON are more prominent for higher CON portfolios, not affected 
by firm size, book-to-market ratio, and total accruals, and do not concentrate in any single year. 
These findings suggest that behavioral-based mispricing also contributes to the positive relation 
between CON and equity capital cost, which is partially caused by overreaction to bad earnings 
news and supports the loss-aversion argument.  
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) offers a nature experiment for 
investigating the three abovementioned influences on CON-equity cost relation. SOX regulations 
were promulgated to increase financial reporting transparency, reduce information asymmetry, 
and improve market efficiency. Combined with effects of dampened risk-taking and constrained 
level of capital which decreases firms’ operational risk (Kang et al. 2010; Bargeron et al. 2010), 
we argue that SOX should have mitigated information asymmetry, behavioral, and fundamental 
downside risk influences of conditional conservatism on the cost of equity capital, despite a 
previously documented enhanced conditional conservatism following the enactment of SOX (e.g., 
Lobo and Zhou 2006; Biddle et al. 2011). To test this conjecture, we examine Fama-MacBeth 
regressions before and after SOX was enacted, and find confirming evidence that the positive 
association between CON and cost of equity capital disappears in the post-SOX period. The 
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finding suggests that the positive CON-equity cost relation detected in the pre-SOX period is 
mainly driven by the information asymmetry, fundamental risk, and behavioral effects.  
This study contributes to the literatures on accounting conservatism, equity capital cost, 
and SOX, and holds potential policy implications. We provide a comprehensive description on 
the influences of conditional conservatism on equity cost from the perspectives of informational, 
behavioral, and fundamental risk in markets of inefficient information and imperfect competition. 
We utilize conditional conservatism and cost of equity measures net of the influence of market 
information and unexpected cash flow shocks. Our finding of a positive relation between 
conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital supplements prior evidence of negative or 
insignificant CON-equity cost associations and delivers a more complete presentation of 
conditional conservatism’s impact on firms’ cost of equity. This paper also confirms that SOX 
produced structural changes in the association between conditional conservatism and equity cost, 
consistent with its intended mitigation of information asymmetry and improved market 
efficiency. Evidence documented in this study further helps inform deliberations regarding the 
economic influence of accounting conservatism, which the FASB and IASB recently removed as 
a fundamental characteristic of financial information in favor of neutrality.  
We proceed as follows. Section II explains measures used for key variables and research 
design. Section III reports main asset pricing test results. Section IV tests separately the 
influences of information asymmetry, behavioral mispricing, and earnings downside risk. 
Section V examines associations between conditional conservatism and equity costs before and 
after the implementation of SOX. Section VI reports robustness checks. Section VII concludes. 
II. Measurement and Research Methodology 
We examine the relation between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital under 
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an imperfect market setting and from the perspectives of informational, fundamental, and 
behavioral influences. Ideally, the conditional conservatism measure should be free of the 
confounding impacts of stock market information, and the realized equity return as proxy for ex 
anti cost of equity should be net of unexpected cash flow shocks, as both cases could induce 
spurious associations and biased inferences. In particular, a qualified CON measure in this 
context should not endogenously incorporate the firm’s stock return which already incorporates 
effects of information asymmetry and its feedback to firms’ investment and investors’ behavior, 
especially when cost of equity is measured using equity return, otherwise a potential mechanical 
relation may result by construction. For the same reason, it is important to control for unexpected 
cash flow shocks (cash flow news) embedded in realized equity returns to measure investors’ 
expected return for equity investment (i.e., firms’ cost of equity). Prior evidence suggests that 
conditional conservatism is closely related to cash flow news (e.g., Callen et al. 2010; Kim and 
Pevzner 2010; Biddle et al. 2011b) that is compounded into stock prices.7 Cash flow news may 
also subsume private information feedback effects (Gao and Liang 2011) and increase 
information asymmetry (Gow et al. 2011). Therefore, asset pricing tests without controlling for 
cash flow news may yield spurious results about the impact of conservatism on cost of capital.  
To facilitate our analyses, we measure cost of equity using realized excess returns that 
explicitly control for cash flow news and employ accounting-based conditional conservatism 
measures that are free from market information. Both treatments are amendable to our research 
purpose of a comprehensive examination about CON’s influence on firms’ equity cost under 
inefficient and noncompetitive market conditions, which allows for the functions of information 
                                                 
7
 Callen et al. (2010) develop CR ratio, a market-based conservatism measure from the relation between conditional 
conservatism and cash flow news. Kim and Pevzner (2010) provide evidence that higher conditional conservatism is associated 
with lower probability of future bad cash flow news. Biddle et al. (2011b) similarly find that conditional conservatism increases 
OCF upside potential and thus the probability of good cash flow news. 
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asymmetry, fundamental risk, and investors’ behaviors in addition to the information precision 
effect documented in prior studies. In this sense, our measures are supplements rather than 
substitutes for existing proxies for conditional conservatism and equity cost.  
Conditional Conservatism Measure 
In the main tests, our accounting-based conditional conservatism measure CON equals the 
average of accumulated non-operational accruals (CON_Acm) and negative earnings skewness 
(CON_Skew) which are defined as follows: 
CON_Acm is defined as negative one times the ratio of accumulated non-operating accruals to 
accumulated total assets, with both computed using a rolling average of current and prior two 
years for each firm-year observation, and 
Nonoperating accruals = Total accruals - ∆accounts receivable (Compustat RECT)     (1) 
       - ∆inventories (Compustat INVT) - ∆prepaid expenses (Compustat XPP)  
       + ∆accounts payable (Compustat AP) + ∆taxes payable (Compustat TXT) 
This measure follows Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Biddle et al. (2011a, 2011b) and captures 
bad earnings news reporting via non-operational accruals, e.g., those arising from restructuring 
charges and asset write-downs. 
CON_Skew is defined as negative one times the ratio of the sum of ten and earnings skewness to 
the sum of ten and the skewness of OCF, where skewness is estimated using a rolling window of 
20 quarters of earnings and OCF, with minimum requirement for 12 quarters of data. This 
measure derives from Givoly and Hayn (2000) and adapts the negative skewness measure in 
Zhang (2008) to ensure that higher skewness indicates a higher degree of conditional 
conservatism. We deflate earnings skewness by OCF skewness to control for the influence of 
shocks in cash flow. 
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Since CON_Acm and CON_Skew are both noisy proxies for conditional conservatism and 
may capture non-conservatism elements such as big-baths, we use their average CON to help 
mitigate potential measurement errors. In later robustness tests, we examine CON_Acm and 
CON_Skew seperately. We also employ negative earnings skewness Skew, defined as the 
difference between the skewness of OCF and earnings estimated over a rolling window of 20 
quarters (Callen et al. 2010), and the average of Skew and CON_Acm as alternative conditional 
conservatism measures.  
Cost of Equity Measure 
Our cost of equity measures control for the effect of cash flow news by subtracting it from 
future realized excess returns, extending the methodology in McInnis (2010) and Ogneva 
(2010).8 Specifically, we calculate cash flow news (Ne) as follows: First, we estimate earnings 
surprises (SURP) from a time-series earnings prediction model augmented by economic 
determinants of earnings, assuming that annual earnings for firm i follow an AR (1) process. We 
use a rolling window of five years to fit model (2) below by Fama and French (1997) industry 
classifications: 
EARNit+1 = β0 + β1EARNit + β2SALEit + β3SIZEit + εit+1 (2) 
where EARNit+1 (EARNit) is earnings over book equity for the next (current) fiscal year, SALEit is 
sales over book value of total assets for the current fiscal year, and SIZEit is firm size measured 
as the natural logarithm of market equity at the current fiscal year-end. 
Earnings surprise SURPit+1 is then calculated as the difference between the actual and 
predicted EARN times the book value of equity, scaled by the beginning-of-month market value 
of equity. We obtain cash flow news from monthly cross-sectional regressions of excess stock 
                                                 
8
 Another measure for cash flow news is earnings forecast error (Botosan et al. 2011; Ogneva 2010), which is not used in our 
main tests since earnings forecast bias introduces further estimation bias. However, in robustness checks, we use it as alternative 
proxy for cash flow news with similar results.  
  13 
returns on contemporaneous earnings surprises using a linear OLS specification. Cash flow news 
(Neit+1) is calculated as the product of SURPit+1 and its estimated coefficient from the following 
models: 
Rrawit+1 = α0 + α1SURPit+1 + εit+1 (3) 
Nei t+1 = ά1SURPit+1 (4) 
where Rraw is monthly excess return, ά1 is the estimated α1 in model (3). We use the next month’s 
excess return adjusted for cash flow news Rit+1 as the cost of equity capital proxy, i.e., Rit+1 = α0 
+ εit+1 = Rrawit+1 - Neit+1.   
Information Asymmetry and Fundamental Risk Measures 
We use three measures for information asymmetry: the average daily percentage bid-ask 
spread IRisk, the average daily high and low spread HLSpread, and private information trading 
Itrade, with definitions given below: 
IRisk: the average daily percentage bid-ask spread over the 12 months prior to the current fiscal 
year-end. 
HLSpread: the average daily high and low spread over the 12 months prior to the current fiscal 
year-end, calculated following Corwin and Schultz (2011). 
Itrade: private information trading estimated as in Llorente et al. (2002) and Ferreira and Laux 
(2007). 
IRisk and HLSpread reflect information asymmetry in general, while Itrade denotes 
information asymmetry arising from speculators' information hunting. We use IRisk in the main 
tests and employ HLSpread and Itrade in robustness checks.  
We adopt the following downside risk measures to capture fundamental risk in firms’ 
operation, following Luo et al. (2011):   
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ERisk: the root lower partial moment of total accruals calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of one plus the accrual root lower partial moment over one plus the accrual root upper 
partial moment.9 
AERisk: the root lower partial moment of earnings over total assets (ROA) calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of one plus the root lower partial moment of ROA over one plus the 
accrual root upper partial moment of ROA.  
Since accrual-based downside risk ERisk is the main source of earnings downside risk and 
drives its relation with cost of capital (Luo et al. 2011), we use ERisk in our main tests and 
AERisk in robustness checks. 
Asset Pricing Methodology 
Our main approach to examining the relation between conditional conservatism and cost of 
equity capital follows standard asset pricing methods including hedging portfolio analysis, 
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression, and two-stage cross-sectional regression (2SCSR) 
analysis, as elaborated below. We also employ other approaches such as pooled OLS regression 
in robustness checks.  
Hedging Portfolio Analysis 
We first use a hedging portfolio approach that buys (sells) stocks with high (low) 
conditional conservatism measures to assess the association of conditional conservatism with 
cost of equity (cash flow news adjusted excess equity returns).10 Specifically, for each month, 
stocks are assigned to one of five portfolios based on a firm’s most recent CON, with at least 
four months lag, with portfolio 1 (5) containing firms with the lowest (highest) level of CON. 
                                                 
9
 See Luo et al. (2011) for estimation details. We utilize accrual downside risk because it is the source of earnings downside risk 
and has better prediction power for fundamental operational risk (Luo et al. 2011). 
10
 Henceforth, we use the terms return or equity return to represent the excess returns adjusted for cash flow news, provided that 
no confusion arises. 
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Monthly return difference between the highest (portfolio 5) and lowest (portfolio 1) CON 
portfolios is computed with a significant positive (negative) mean difference indicating a positive 
(negative) relation between CON and cost of equity capital. 
Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regression 
To control for other factors that may influence the CON-return relation, we regress 
firm-specific excess returns adjusted for cash flow news on CON and other firm characteristics. 
We match annual CON estimates with monthly returns in the next 12 months starting four 
months after the fiscal year-end. For example, for firms with fiscal year t ending on December, 
we collect monthly returns data from April of calendar year t+1 to March of calendar year t+2. 
The following cross-sectional regression models are estimated monthly, and the coefficient 
parameters are averaged following the procedures in Fama and MacBeth (1973): 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + µit (5) 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + µit (6) 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + β5Momentumit + µit (7) 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + β5TCAit + µit (8) 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit +β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + β5Accit + β6Low_Pricedit + µit (9) 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + β5Momentumit + β6TCAit (10) 
 
 + β7Accit + β8 Low_Pricedit + µit           
with variables defined as: 
CONit = conditional conservatism measure for stock i in month t, 
Rit+1 = monthly return adjusted for cash flow news for stock i in month t +1, 
RFt+1 = the U.S. one-month T-bill rate in month t +1, 
Betait = beta of stock i for month t estimated as in Fama and French (1992), 
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Sizeit = the natural logarithm of market capitalization for stock i in month t as in Fama and 
French (1992), 
BMit = the natural logarithm of the ratio of book to market equity for stock i in month t as in 
Fama and French (1992), 
Momentumit = the buy-and-hold return of stock i for the 11-month period ending one-month prior 
to the current month t, 
TCAit = total accrual measured in the balance sheet approach scaled by total asset, following 
Sloan (1996),11
 
Accit = the decile ranking of accrual quality from Kim and Qi (2010) and Ogneva (2010),12 
Low_Pricedit = the indicator variable for returns with two adjacent prices of less than five U.S. 
dollars as defined in Kim and Qi (2010).
 
Among the control variables, Beta, Size, and BM are commonly accepted factors that affect 
expected stock return. We include Momentum to ensure that the results are not attributable to 
conservative firms with previous negative returns. Since one CON component (CON_Acm) is 
accrual-based, we control for TCA and Acc to ensure that the relation between conditional 
conservatism and equity return is robust to the pricing effects of TCA and Acc (Khan 2008; 
Ogneva 2010; Kim and Qi 2010). Low_Priced is also controlled along with Acc since penny 
stocks substantially impact Acc’s pricing (Kim and Qi 2010). Following Lewellen et al. (2010), 
we include industry dummies in cross-sectional regressions to address the concern that missing 
industry effects may bias the coefficient estimates. 
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 TCAit = (∆CAit - ∆CLit - ∆Cashit + ∆STDEBTit + ∆TPit - DPit)/ATAit, where ∆CAit is one-year change in current assets, ∆CLit 
is one-year change in current liabilities, ∆Cashit is one-year change in cash, ∆STDEBTit is one-year change in current liabilities, 
∆TPit is income tax payable, DP is depreciation expense, and ATAit is average total assets over years t-1, t and t+1. 
12
 The Acc measure is defined as the decile ranking of the ratio of standard deviation of residual from the regression TCAit = αt + 
β0t / ATAit + β1tOCFit-1 + β2tOCFit + β3tOCFit+1 + β4t∆REVit + β5t PPEit + εit, where TCAit is total current accruals for year t as 
defined above, OCFit is operating cash flow for year t, ∆REVit is one-year change in revenues, and PPEit is property, plant, and 
equipment for year t. 
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Portfolio-Level Two-stage Asset Pricing Test 
We further conduct a two-stage cross-sectional regression (2SCSR) analysis on 
Fama-French 25 size and BM portfolios to examine possible risk-based asset pricing 
implications of conditional conservatism. In the first stage, we construct a conservatism factor 
RCON, which represents return on a zero-investment portfolio buying the top 20 percent of firms 
and selling the bottom 20 percent of firms sorted by CON, and estimate multivariate betas from 
time-series regressions of excess returns for a portfolio of firms according to size and BM, Rqt - 
RFt, on contemporaneous portfolio returns to the Fama-French and momentum factors, along 
with RCON. The first-stage models are: 
Rqt - RFt = b0 + bq,RM_RF(RMt - RFt) + bq,SMBSMBt + bq,HMLHMLt + bq,RCONRCONt + εqt (11) 
Rqt - RFt = b0 + bq,RM_RF(RMt - RFt) + bq,SMBSMBt + bq,HMLHMLt (12) 
+ bq,ACCUMDt + bq,RCONRCONt + εqt 
with definitions of variables as: 
Rqt = the average excess return on size-BM portfolio q in month t, 
RFt = the U.S. one-month T-bill rate in month t, 
RCONqt = return on CON factor as explained above, 
RMt - RFt = return on market portfolio (CRSP value-weighted) minus the risk-free rate proxied by 
the U.S. one-month T-bill rate, 
SMBt = return on a factor-mimicking hedge portfolio for size as in Fama and French (1993), 
HMLt = return on a factor-mimicking hedge portfolio for BM as in Fama and French (1993),  
UMDt = return on a factor-mimicking hedge portfolio for momentum as in Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). 
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The second stage estimates cross-sectional regressions of mean excess factor returns on 
factor loadings estimated in the first-stage time-series regressions, as follows: 
Rqt - RFt = a0 + a1bq,RM_RF + a2bq,SMB + a3bq,HML + a4bq,RCON + ηqt (13) 
Rqt - RFt = a0 + a1bq,RM_RF + a2bq,SMB + a3bq,HML + a4bq,UMD + a4bq,RCON + ηqt (14) 
where bq,RM_RF, bq,SMB, bq,HML, bq,UMD, and bq,RCON are factor loadings estimated in the first stage. 
If
 
the estimated coefficients for bq,RCON are significantly positive (negative), then RCON is 
deemed to reflect a priced factor with a positive (negative) risk premium. 
Methodology for Testing Effects of Information Asymmetry, Fundamental Risk, and 
Behavior-based Mispricing   
Using our measures for information asymmetry and fundamental risk, we directly examine 
their associations with conditional conservatism via a portfolio approach and their roles in 
explaining the CON-equity cost relation by controlling for them in multivariate regressions. 
Specifically, we first construct five CON-based portfolios, and check the levels of information 
asymmetry (IRisk) and earnings downside risk (ERisk) in each portfolio. If high-CON portfolios 
on average have significantly higher IRisk and/or ERisk, this suggests that conditional 
conservatism can generally elevate perceptions of information asymmetry and/or earnings 
downside risk. We then use the following Fama-MacBeth models to investigate the explanatory 
power of these two influences: 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + β5IRiskit (15) 
+ ∑Industry_Dummies + µit 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + β5ERiskit (16) 
+ ∑Industry_Dummies + µit 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + β5IRiskit+ β6ERiskit (17) 
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+ ∑Industry_Dummies + µit 
where Rit+1, RFt+1, Betait, Sizeit, and CONit are defined as in models (5)-(10), and 
Industry_Dummies are Fama and French (1997) industry classifications. If CON affects the cost 
of equity capital via information asymmetry and/or earnings downside risk, then adding IRisk 
and ERisk should weaken their relation as reflected in the magnitude and significance levels of 
the CON coefficient. 
To test the existence of behavior-based mispricing, we adopt a double-sorted portfolio 
approach that first controls for commonly perceived risk factors like size, BM, and total accruals, 
and then checks whether high-CON portfolios exhibit high equity costs. We also conduct 
standard hedging portfolio analysis for CON in each fiscal year. If a high cost of equity is 
associated with more conservatism firms after controlling for size and BM, and such a relation 
does not cluster in any particular year, then mispricing may exist (Bernard et al. 1997). 
Additional evidence regarding asymmetric loss-aversion is obtained by examining the difference 
in cost of equity between relatively high-CON portfolios and relatively low-CON portfolios. For 
example, if the equity cost spread between the top two CON portfolios is larger than that 
between the bottom two portfolios, then investors’ over-reactions to bad earnings news lend 
support to a mispricing effect.  
III. Data and Main Results on the Relation between Conditional Conservatism 
and Cost of Equity 
Our sample consists of all common stocks traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX 
during the period from January 1986 to December 2008. Daily and monthly returns and the U.S. 
one-month T-bill rates are obtained from CRSP, with corresponding accounting data retrieved 
from COMPUSTAT. CON estimates are winsorized to the 1% and 99% percentiles of Fama and 
French (1997) industry distributions for each fiscal year to abate potential biases from outliers. 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the main tests. Panel A shows 
that the mean (median) of CON and its two components, CON_Acm and CON_Skew, are -0.5035 
(-0.5129), 0.0085 (0.0116), and -1.0155 (-1.0303), respectively.13 Panel B indicates that the 
Pearson and Spearman correlations of CON with CON_Skew and CON_Acm are significantly 
positive, within the range of 0.1300 to 0.9913, thus lending construction validity to CON as a 
representative conditional conservatism measure. Nonetheless, the Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation between CON_Skew and CON_Acm is only 0.0018 (0.0623), with the former 
statistically insignificant, which is not necessarily inappropriate since each gauges conditional 
conservatism in different dimensions: CON_Skew measures conservatism arising from earnings 
distribution, while CON_Acm indicates conservatism arising from non-operating assets. In 
addition, all Pearson and Spearman correlations of conditional conservatism measures with total 
accruals (TCA) are significantly negative, whereas those with accrual quality (Acc) are 
significantly positive. This suggests that accounting-based CON measures convey information 
about total accrual and accrual quality, but this information is not exactly the same as (and 
therefore cannot be subsumed by) that contained in firms’ total accruals and accrual quality.  
Hedging Portfolio Analysis 
Table 2 reports hedging portfolio analysis results for average excess returns adjusted for 
cash flow news and abnormal returns represented by alphas, as well as other relevant measures. 
We construct five CON-sorted portfolios rebalanced each month, with portfolio 1 (5) 
representing firms with the smallest (largest) CON. Average cash flow news adjusted excess 
                                                 
13
 The mean (median) of total accrual TCA is 0.0099 (0.0080), which is higher than the documented negative values in Sloan 
(1996), due to different sampling periods. The sampling period in this study is 1986 to 2008, whereas the sampling period in 
Sloan (1996) is 1962 to 1991. As we extend the sampling period back to 1962, the mean and median of total accrual become 
negative, in line with Sloan’s (1996) evidence. 
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returns (Ret) and three abnormal return measures (CAPM alpha, 3-factor alpha, and 4-factor 
alpha) all increase monotonically with the magnitude of CON, with the average mean differences 
between the top and bottom portfolios as 0.0053, 0.0044, 0.0048, and 0.0056, respectively, all 
statistically significant. A similar pattern is observed for Momentum. In contrast, total accruals 
(TCA) decline monotonically with CON, with an average of 0.0181 for portfolio 1 and 0.0005 for 
portfolio 5. The mean difference of -0.0176 is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level, 
suggesting that CON is negatively correlated with TCA, consistent with evidence in Table 1. The 
pattern for accrual quality Acc, although non-monotonic, generally exhibits a positive relation 
with CON: the mean difference between portfolios 1 and 5 is 0.0338, statistically significant at 
the 1% confidence level. Overall, Table 2 provides evidence that higher CON is associated with 
higher expected returns (alphas or cash flow news adjusted excess return), implying that higher 
conditional conservatism increases cost of equity. Moreover, CON is shown to be significantly 
correlated with return momentum, total accrual, and accrual quality, indicating a need to control 
for these variables in the multivariate cross-sectional regressions. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
Table 3 presents results for Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly cash 
flow news adjusted excess returns on CON and other firm risk characteristics including Beta, 
Size, BM, Momentum, TCA, and Acc. Following Kim and Qi (2010), we also include Low-priced, 
an indicator for low-priced shares along with Acc. Panels A and B present results without and 
with controls for Fama and French (1997) industries, respectively. 
Consistent with portfolio analysis results, cross-sectional loadings on CON are consistently 
positive and significant, with univariate coefficients (t-statistics) of 0.0138 (3.54) and 0.0098 
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(3.32), without and with controlling for industry effects, respectively.14 After Beta, Size, and BM 
are added as further controls, CON coefficients remain significantly positive, with corresponding 
coefficients (t-statistics) of 0.0091 (3.42) and 0.0063 (2.77) in Panels A and B, respectively. 
Moreover, CON’s effect on the cost of equity is not subsumed by either Momentum, TCA, or Acc 
when they enter into the regressions individually or collectively, suggesting that CON provides 
information beyond that from momentum, total accruals, and accrual quality. Therefore, results 
in Table 3 reconfirm that conditional conservatism is positively related to cost of equity capital, 
which cannot be captured by standard risk factors and is not contributable to total accruals and/or 
accrual quality effects. The relation is also robust to industrial characteristics.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Portfolio-Level Two-Stage Cross-Sectional Regressions (2SCSR) Analysis 
To further confirm conditional conservatism’s impact on cost of equity, we conduct 
two-stage cross-sectional regression analysis at the portfolio level, which is less affected by 
firm-specific characters that may contaminate the underlying relation considered. Table 4 reports 
estimation results for models (11) to (14). Panel A presents the first-stage time-series regressions 
of monthly portfolio excess stock returns adjusted for cash flow news on the CON factor (RCON) 
and the three Fama and French (1993) factors and a momentum factor (UMD). Factor loadings 
on RCON are significantly positive, with a magnitude (t-statistic) 0.4725 (4.16) when the three 
Fama-French factors are controlled, and 0.3814 (3.87) when the momentum factor UMD is 
added as a further control, respectively. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
                                                 
14
 Rigorously speaking, Model 1 in Panel B is not an univariate regression because it also includes industry dummy variables. 
We call it univariate here for simplicity. 
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Panel B reports results for the second-stage cross-sectional regressions of excess portfolio 
returns on factor loadings estimated from the first stage. The coefficients for factor loadings on 
RCON (βRCON) are significantly positive with magnitudes (t-statistics) of 0.0051 (3.42) and 
0.0055 (3.49) when loadings on Fama and French (1993) three factors and Carhart (1997) four 
factors are controlled, respectively. The last column indicates that when βRCON is included, 
average adjusted R2 jumps from 0.4170 to 0.7566 for the three-factor model, and from 0.4086 to 
0.7530 for the four-factor model. This evidence from the 2SCSR analysis provides further 
support for CON as an enhancing force for cost of equity, and the mechanisms that contribute to 
this positive relation will be explored in next section. 
IV. Informational, Fundamental, and Behavioral Effects on the Relation 
between Conditional Conservatism and Cost of Equity 
Information Asymmetry and Fundamental Risk Effects 
Table 5 reports results from portfolio analyses and Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional 
regressions for testing propositions regarding the information asymmetry and fundamental risk 
effects. Panel A presents the mean values of information asymmetry measure IRisk and 
fundamental (earnings) downside risk measure ERisk in different CON-sorted portfolios, where 
portfolio 1 (5) contains firms with smallest (largest) CON, respectively. IRisk increases 
non-monotonically with CON, revealing an asymmetric “V” pattern. It falls from 0.0303 for 
portfolio 1 to 0.0284 for portfolio 2, suggesting that conditional conservatism serves to reduce 
information asymmetry at lower levels, then it increases monotonically from 0.0284 for portfolio 
2 to 0.0350 for portfolio 5, implying that CON increases information asymmetry at higher levels. 
The mean difference of IRisk between portfolios 5 and 1 is 0.0047, statistically significant at the 
1% confidence level. Therefore, conditional conservatism is nonlinearly associated with 
information asymmetry, but on average a positive relation dominates, suggesting that high 
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conditional conservatism may be associated with high cost of equity capital since it enhances 
information asymmetry as suggested by Lambert et al. (2012) and Gow et al. (2011). Similarly, 
the earnings downside risk measure ERisk increases monotonically with CON, and the mean 
difference between the top and bottom portfolios is 0.0567, statistically significant at the 1% 
confidence level. Since earnings downside risk has been shown to induce a higher cost of equity 
(Luo et al. 2011)), this finding suggests that the positive relation of conditional conservatism 
with downside risk in earnings may also contribute to its positive association with the cost of 
equity capital.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Panel B of Table 5 presents evidence from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions 
estimated using models (15) to (17) regarding the explanatory power of information and earnings 
downside risks on the positive relation between CON and cost of equity. The coefficients for 
CON become much smaller than in Panel B of Table 3 where IRisk and ERisk are not controlled. 
In particular, the coefficient (t-statistic) for CON drops to 0.0053 (2.13) and 0.0049 (2.22), 
respectively, after adding IRisk and ERisk as further controls in models in Table 5 Panel B, 
compared with a figure of 0.0063 (2.77) in the model in Table 3 Panel B that only controls for 
the three Fama-French factors. Importantly, the coefficient (t-statistic) for CON drops to 0.0041 
(1.68) when both IRisk and ERisk are controlled. Combined, the findings indicate that either 
information asymmetry or earnings downside risk partially explains CON effects individually, 
and they further subsume a larger portion of CON loading when both are included in the model. 
This evidence lends support to the argument that the positive CON-equity cost relation reflects 
the effects of information asymmetry and fundamental downside risk. 
Behavioral Effect 
  25 
If markets are not perfectly efficient, conditional conservatism also holds the potential to 
increase the cost of equity via mispricing caused by investors’ irrational behaviors such as 
loss-aversion. We test this conjecture following the spirit of Daniel et al. (2001) and Bernard et 
al. (1997). Daniel et al. (2001) argue that risk factors identified using asset pricing tests may still 
capture mispricing since size or book-to-market ratio measures include the market value of 
equity. Bernard et al. (1997) show that a mispricing explanation may exist if returns to a hedging 
portfolio are consistently positive but do not cluster in any specific period or in firms with small 
sizes and/or low book-to-market ratios. Guided by these reasoning, we first conduct CON 
hedging portfolio tests double sorted on CON and Size or BM. For each month, we assign 
firm-month observations into two Size portfolios (small-bottom 50%, large-top 50%) and three 
BM portfolios (Low-bottom 30%, Medium-middle 40%, High-top 30%). Then within each 
portfolio, we further sort stocks into five groups by most recent (with at least a four-month lag) 
CONs, with group 1 (5) containing firms with small (large) CON.  
Table 6 reports test results for the mispricing effect. Panel A shows that Size- and 
CON-sorted hedging portfolio excess returns (after adjusting for cash flow news) are higher in 
small firms but do not disappear in large firms, with mean return spreads (t-statistics) of 0.0073 
(3.90) and 0.0018 (1.75) between the lowest and highest CON portfolios for small and large size 
groups, respectively. Similarly, Panel B indicates that BM- and CON-sorted hedging portfolio 
returns are all significant for high-, medium-, and low-BM firms, with mean return differences 
(t-statistics) between portfolios 5 and 1 of 0.0078 (5.27), 0.0040 (2.65), and 0.0035 (1.85), 
respectively. These results suggest that hedging portfolio returns do not concentrate in small or 
low-BM firms and that behavior-induced mispricing helps explain the documented CON-equity 
cost relation. 
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Insert Table 6 about here 
Extending the above method, we further address the concern whether the behavioral effect 
is a disguise of the accrual anomaly which is also subject to mispricing explanations (Sloan 1996; 
Xie 2001; Richardson et al. 2005) by constructing portfolios double-sorted on TCA and CON. 
We first assign firms into three TCA portfolios (Low-bottom 30%, Medium-middle 40%, 
High-top 30%), and then sort stocks into five CON groups within each portfolio. Results in Panel 
C indicate that CON-sorted hedging portfolio returns are all significant for high-, medium-, and 
low-TCA firms, with mean return differences (t-statistics) between CON groups 5 and 1 of 
0.0031 (1.76), 0.0048 (3.79), and 0.0061 (3.40), respectively. Therefore, despite that the cost of 
equity spread is relatively smaller among firms with large total accruals, possible mispricing 
caused by conditional conservatism is not subsumed by and is not a camouflage for accrual 
anomaly. 
We then specifically check whether the CON hedging portfolio returns are clustered in any 
certain period and report portfolio analysis results for each sample year in Table 7, which shows 
that for the period prior to 2002 when the SOX was enacted, most years (15 out of total 17 years) 
exhibit positive average return differences between high- and low-CON portfolios, especially 
when statistically significant. For the period after 2003, the mean return differences become 
insignificantly negative, possibly due to mitigated mispricing caused by enhanced financial 
reporting transparency (and reduced information asymmetry) and market efficiency after SOX, a 
phenomenon to be explained in more details in Section V. Generally, as suggested by Bernard et 
al. (1997), the findings provide additional evidence that the positive association between 
conditional conservatism and cost of equity in the pre-SOX period is partially explained by 
mispricing effect. 
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Insert Table 7 about here 
Next we explore the potential causes for the mispricing effect on the association between 
conditional conservatism and cost of equity. A second look at Table 2 reveals that loss-aversion 
may be a partial explanation. If there is no overreaction to bad new driven by loss-aversion, then 
the return spread between CON portfolios 2 and 1 should be no smaller than that between 
portfolios 5 and 4. Nonetheless, for either cash flow news adjusted excess return Ret or abnormal 
returns (alphas), the 2-1 return spreads are consistently smaller than the 5-4 return spreads. For 
example, the differences in Ret between portfolios 2 and 1 and between portfolios 5 and 4 are 
0.0014 and 0.0019, respectively, and the corresponding differences in 4-factor alpha are 0.0011 
and 0.0023, respectively. Similar observations can be obtained for CAPM and 3-factor alphas too. 
These findings suggest that over-reaction to bad news via loss-aversion is at least partially 
responsible for the behavior-related mispricing in explaining the positive relation between 
conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital. 
V. SOX and the Conditional Conservatism - Cost of Equity Relation 
Thus far we have found supporting evidence on the informational, behavioral, and 
fundamental effects of conditional conservatism on its association with the cost of equity. If 
these influences play a role, then the passage of SOX provides an ideal natural experiment 
wherein their effects should be reduced (Chang et al. 2009; Skaife et al. 2009; Amir et al. 2010).15 
SOX legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress in 2003 in response to allegations of accounting 
irregularities in Enron and other firms was intended in part to mitigate information asymmetry 
between firms and investors and enhance market efficiency. Whereas several prior studies 
                                                 
15
 Chang et al. (2009) report that SOX reduces cost of equity capital in general by improving financial reporting quality. Skaife et 
al. (2009) provide evidence that SOX reduces cost of equity via mandatory disclosures of internal control weaknesses. Amir et al. 
(2010) likewise argue that SOX enhances negative relation between auditor independence and cost of debt capital proxied by bond 
ratings and yields.  
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document increased conditional conservatism in the post-SOX period (e.g., Lobo and Zhou 2006; 
Biddle et al. 2011a), our design lends itself to further detecting potential reductions in equity risk 
arising from reduced information asymmetry in the post-SOX period, thus complementing prior 
findings. The decrease in information asymmetry further boosts market efficiency and shrinks 
potential mispricing. SOX also constrained firms' investment and risk-taking (Kang et al. 2010; 
Bargeron et al. 2010) and thus their need for new information from the market, implying a 
diminished feedback effect. A reduction in fundamental business risk in post-SOX era implies a 
reduced equity premium on earnings downside risk and a lesser role for fundamental risk in 
affecting the CON-equity cost relation. Based on these arguments, we expect a diminished 
association between conditional conservatism and equity cost after SOX is enacted. This serves 
to provide additional support for the informational, behavioral, and fundamental risk influences 
of conditional conservatism on increasing the cost of equity in the pre-SOX period. 
Figure 1 graphically presents per-year average cash flow news adjusted excess returns to 
CON-sorted portfolios. A striking pattern is observed whereby hedging portfolio returns are 
consistently positive for most years during the pre-SOX period of 1986-2002. The hedging 
returns become negative from 2004 through 2008, the post-SOX period, with generally smaller 
magnitudes and variances compared with the pre-SOX period. The spike in 2003 is consistent 
with enhanced revelations of bad news associated with the implementation of SOX. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
To further examine the influence of SOX, we conduct firm-level Fama-MacBeth 
cross-sectional regressions of cash flow news adjusted excess returns on CON and other control 
variables separately for the pre- and post-SOX periods and report the results in Panels A and B in 
Table 8, respectively. To avoid possible noise from market reactions to the regulation, we omit 
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years when SOX was passed (2002) and implemented (2003). Panel A reveals that the positive 
CON loadings are driven primarily by observations from the pre-SOX period. In particular, CON 
is positively and significantly associated with returns in all regressions before the 
implementation of SOX. Panel B indicates that CON coefficients are generally negative and/or 
insignificant in the post-SOX period, consistent with Figure 1. In summary, results in pre- and 
post-SOX periods collectively corroborate the propositions about the information asymmetry, 
fundamental risk, and behavioral channels through which conditional conservatism enhances the 
cost of equity capital. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
VI. Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of the main test results, we separately use CON_Skew, CON_Acm, 
and the ranking of CON as alternative measures for conditional conservatism, with results 
qualitatively unchanged. We also adopt two other CON proxies: Skew and CONA. Following 
Callen et al. (2010), Skew is defined as the difference between the skewness of OCF and earnings 
estimated over a rolling window of 20 quarters, and CONA is measured as the average of 
CON_Acm and Skew. Using these proxies also leads to qualitatively similar results. Moreover, 
extending Botosan et al. (2011), we use analyst forecast error as an alternative proxy for cash 
flow news, which is computed as the difference between reported annual earnings per share less 
its analysts’ forecast, deflated by month-end stock price. The empirical results are similar to 
previously reported.  
For information asymmetry measures, we alternatively use the annual average of daily high 
and low spread HLspread following Corwin and Schultz (2011), as well as Itrade following 
Llorente et al. (2002) and Ferreira and Laux (2007). For earnings downside risk, we utilize Jones 
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(1991) model to predict total accruals in calculating ERisk. We further adopt the root lower 
partial moment of return on asset AERisk as a substitute measure. When these alternative 
measures for information asymmetry and earnings downside risk are used, results are consistent 
with those reported in the main tests. 
In the asset pricing tests, following McInnis (2010), we drop all return-months in which a 
firm announces future quarterly earnings to reduce the possibility that improper adjustments for 
cash flow news may bias the results. We also add liquidity beta as a control for liquidity effects 
not sufficiently captured by the Low-Priced dummy. Both schemes deliver findings that are 
qualitatively similar to previously reported. Finally, the address the concern that the results for 
post-SOX period are driven by the price plump and illiquidity during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, we drop years of 2007 and 2008 from our post-SOX period and replicate Panel B of Table 
8, and achieve qualitatively unchanged results.  
VII. Conclusions 
Conditional conservatism helps lower cost of equity capital by improving disclosure 
quality. At the same time, it also affects information asymmetry, influences firms’ fundamental 
operation, and causes possible behavior-driven mispricing, especially in imperfect markets, 
which holds the potential to increase the cost of equity capital. How conditional conservatism is 
related to equity cost is determined by the combined effect from these channels. Using 
accounting-based conditional conservatism measure and cash flow news adjusted expected 
equity cost proxy, we find a significantly positive relation between conditional conservatism and 
cost of equity capital that operates via information asymmetry, behavioral mispricing, and 
earnings downside risk. We provide confirming evidence that the positive association between 
conditional conservatism and equity capital cost largely disappears in the post-SOX period, 
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consistent with mitigated information asymmetry and diminished behavioral influences and 
fundamental business risk engendered by SOX. 
This study contributes to accounting conservatism literature by providing original evidence 
that conditional conservatism increases the cost of equity capital, and by relating it to 
informational, behavioral, and fundamental risk dimensions, thus supplementing prior literature 
about the equity cost decreasing effect of conditional conservatism via improved information 
quality only. Our findings hold implications for ongoing deliberations regarding the costs and 
benefits of conservatism as a basic tenet of financial accounting. It also augments the SOX 
literature by documenting a diminution of the influences of conditional conservatism on cost of 
capital, suggesting that SOX regulations reduce the cost of equity capital via informational effect, 
fundamental risk, and behavioral dimensions relevant to conditional conservatism, and connoting 
the importance of considering regulation-induced structural changes in asset pricing tests. 
In this study, we aim at providing a clearer inference about conditional conservatism’s 
impact on cost of equity and propose three mediating channels of informational asymmetry, 
operational risk, and behavioral mispricing, but with no intention to be exhaustive. In this sense, 
our findings do not mean to depict all the facets of conditional conservatism, whose relation with 
cost of equity is by nature complicated. Therefore, the positive relation between conditional 
conservatism and equity cost documented in this study should be treated as a supplement, rather 
than as a substitute, for existing evidence on conservatism-capital cost relation that warrants 
further enquiry.   
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for Conditional Conservatism and Firm Characteristic Variables 
Panel A: Summary Statistics          
 CON CON_Skew CON_Acm TCA Acc IRisk ERisk Size Beta BM Momentum 
Mean -0.5035 -1.0155 0.0085 0.0099 0.0534 0.0278 -0.0063 2411.3615 1.2276 0.6252 0.1570 
STD 0.7700 0.2000 1.5200 0.1200 0.0500 0.0400 0.1200 12724.7500 0.3500 0.4400 0.5900 
Q1 -0.5780 -1.1477 -0.0231 -0.0316 0.0224 0.0061 -0.0544 55.9520 0.9648 0.3256 -0.1667 
Median -0.5129 -1.0303 0.0116 0.0080 0.0379 0.0170 -0.0076 228.4739 1.1726 0.5167 0.0667 
Q3 -0.4291 -0.8726 0.0425 0.0546 0.0664 0.0362 0.0393 1007.6076 1.4421 0.7952 0.3403 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix          
 CON CON_Skew CON_Acm TCA Acc IRisk ERisk Size Beta BM Momentum 
CON 1 0.1338 0.9913 -0.0068 0.2244 0.0174 0.2947 -0.0054 0.0236 -0.0005 0.0016 
CON_Skew 0.9129 1 0.0018 -0.0318 0.2552 0.0663 0.0681 -0.0426 0.1595 0.0434 0.0255 
CON_Acm 0.4001 0.0623 1 -0.0027 0.0493 -0.0158 0.2887 0.0002 0.0027 -0.0063 -0.0017 
TCA -0.056 -0.0375 -0.0386 1 -0.0451 -0.0254 -0.3036 -0.0018 0.0184 -0.114 0.0112 
Acc 0.262 0.278 0.0547 -0.0198 1 0.0419 0.0185 -0.065 0.3004 -0.0714 0.0119 
IRisk 0.0546 0.0942 -0.0699 0.0095 0.1154 1 0.0054 -0.118 0.0588 0.3537 0.0653 
ERisk 0.1447 0.0629 0.2484 -0.327 -0.0026 -0.0112 1 0.0234 0.0099 0.0022 0.0268 
Size -0.1047 -0.1442 0.0564 0.0221 -0.2798 -0.7671 0.0448 1 -0.1202 -0.1248 -0.0019 
Beta 0.1474 0.1531 0.0518 0.0198 0.3271 0.0808 -0.034 -0.2068 1 0.0114 0.0331 
BM 0.0093 0.0305 -0.0622 -0.1314 -0.088 0.362 -0.009 -0.4294 -0.0036 1 0.0619 
Momentum -0.0051 -0.0162 0.0213 0.0019 -0.0717 0.0018 0.0412 0.1026 -0.0527 0.0472 1 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for conditional conservatism measures and firm characteristic variables for the sample period of January 
1986 to December 2008. Panel A shows summary statistics, and Panel B presents Pearson and Spearman correlations among these variables in the 
upper and lower triangles, respectively. Highlighted numbers are statistically significant at the 10% level. Variable definitions are available in 
Sections II.
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TABLE 2. CON-Sorted Portfolio Analysis for Average Monthly Cash Flow News Adjusted 
Excess Return, Alphas, Momentum, Total Accrual, and Accrual Quality 
 
Portfolio Ret CAPM alpha 3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha Momentum TCA Acc 
1 0.0074 0.0031 0.0015 0.003 0.1354 0.0181 0.0431 
2 0.0088 0.0044 0.0027 0.0041 0.1425 0.0132 0.0402 
3 0.0096 0.0049 0.0035 0.0053 0.1511 0.0129 0.0455 
4 0.0108 0.0058 0.0047 0.0062 0.175 0.0093 0.0569 
5 0.0127 0.0074 0.0063 0.0085 0.1772 0.0005 0.0769 
(5-1) 0.0053 0.0044 0.0048 0.0056 0.0418 -0.0176 0.0338 
t-statistic (3.96)*** (3.70)*** (4.63)*** (4.87)*** (5.60)*** (-23.68)*** (40.75)*** 
 
The table compares cash flow news adjusted excess returns, abnormal returns (alphas), momentum, total accruals, 
and accrual quality across five portfolios formed on conditional conservatism (CON) for a sample of 62,833 
observations of firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Amex with available CON measures over the period of 
January 1986 to December 2008. At the end of each month, firm-month observations are assigned into five 
portfolios based on the firm’s most recent CON known four or more months prior to the current date. Portfolio 1 (5) 
contains firms with the smallest (largest) CON. Average differences between the top and bottom portfolios are 
reported in the row (5-1). The t-statistics for these differences are computed with a Newey and West (1987) 
correction. Ret refers to return excluding cash flow news and risk free rate, CAPM alpha, 3-factor alpha and 
4-factor alpha refer to abnormal returns from CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, and Fama-French-Cahart 
four-factor model, respectively, TCA is total accruals (Sloan 1996) and Acc is accrual quality (Kim and Qi 2010). 
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TABLE 3. Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Monthly Cash Flow News Adjusted Excess 
Return on Conditional Conservatism and Other Firm Characteristics 
 Panel A:  Regressions without Industry Dummies 
Model CON Beta Size BM Momentum TCA Acc Low_Priced Avg. Adj. R-square 
1 0.0138        0.0017 
 (3.54)***         
2 0.0091 0.0029 -0.0014 0.0022     0.0256 
 (3.42)*** (0.92) (-2.75)*** (2.46)**      
3 0.0088 0.0019 -0.0015 0.0022 0.0022    0.0325 
 (3.41)*** (0.68) (-3.01)*** (2.52)** (1.24)     
4 0.0085 0.0031 -0.0014 0.0017  -0.0171   0.0267 
 (3.24)*** (1.01) (-2.78)*** (1.97)**  (-5.88)***    
5 0.0115 0.0023 -0.0021 0.0026   0.0324 -0.0158 0.0345 
 (5.24)*** (0.77) (-4.85)*** (3.45)***   (2.45)** (-8.46)***  
6 0.0107 0.0018 -0.0022 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0169 0.0295 -0.0158 0.0419 
 (4.94)*** (0.65) (-5.11)*** (2.97)*** (0.03) (-5.78)*** (2.38)** (-9.30)***  
Panel B:  Regressions with Industry Dummies 
Model CON Beta Size BM Momentum TCA Acc Low_Priced Avg. Adj. R-square 
1 0.0098        0.0367 
 (3.32)***         
2 0.0063 0.0025 -0.0013 0.0025     0.0535 
 (2.77)*** (0.95) (-2.72)*** (3.65)***      
3 0.0061 0.0018 -0.0014 0.0026 0.0008    0.0587 
 (2.73)*** (0.74) (-2.97)*** (3.77)*** (0.48)     
4 0.0059 0.0027 -0.0013 0.0021  -0.0151   0.0544 
 (2.59)*** (1.04) (-2.75)*** (3.07)***  (-5.75)***    
5 0.0106 0.0032 -0.0023 0.0025   0.0103 -0.0159 0.0626 
 (5.01)*** (1.26) (-5.35)*** (3.89)***   (0.96) (-8.90)***  
6 0.0099 0.0028 -0.0024 0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0156 0.0087 -0.0164 0.0682 
  (4.71)*** (1.19) (-5.60)*** (3.54)*** (-0.85) (-5.62)*** (0.85) (-10.00)***   
 
This table presents estimation results for Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly cash flow news adjusted excess returns 
against conditional conservatism (CON) and other firm characteristics including Beta, Size, BM, Momentum, TCA, Acc, and a 
low-priced return indicator variable for the period of January 1986 to December 2008. The reported estimates are time-series 
averages of coefficients from 276 monthly cross-sectional regressions. The t-statistics are calculated from Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors of these monthly averages. Panel A reports results without controlling for Fama and French (1997) 
industry effect, whereas Panel B reports results after controlling for industry effect by adding dummies for the Fama-French 
industries. Monthly cash flow news adjusted excess returns are calculated as the raw return less cash flow news and the risk 
free return proxied by U.S. one-month T-bill rate. Beta is estimated following the procedure in Fama and French (1992). Size is 
the natural log of market capitalization. BM is the natural log of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. We 
match Beta, Size, and BM measures with return data following Fama and French (1992). Momentum is an 11-month return in 
the prior-year omitting the most recent month. CON is the average of firm-year conditional conservatism measure CON_Acm 
and CON_Skew, TCA is total accrual (Sloan 1996), Acc is the accrual quality measure used in Kim and Qi (2010) and Ogneva 
(2010). We match annual estimates of CON, TCA, and Acc with monthly stock returns in the next 12 months starting four 
months after the fiscal year end. The low-priced return indicator is set to 1 if returns are computed using two adjacent prices 
less than $5 and 0 otherwise. The main models used in Panels A and B are estimated using models (5) through (10) described 
in Section II. 
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TABLE 4. Portfolio-level Two-stage Cross-Sectional Regressions 
Panel A:  First-stage Time-series Regressions of Portfolio Returns on Factor Returns 
Model Intercept RM-RF SMB HML UMD RCON Adj. R-square 
1 0.0053 1.0925 0.8475 0.2868   0.7626 
 (4.54)*** (42.25)*** (11.83)*** (4.05)***    
2 0.0031 1.0292 0.7242 0.333  0.4725 0.7857 
 (3.37)*** (31.14)*** (13.71)*** (4.92)***  (4.16)***  
3 0.0077 1.0457 0.8665 0.2272 -0.2305  0.7834 
 (6.38)*** (41.16)*** (11.96)*** (3.06)*** (-11.26)***   
4 0.0056 1.0003 0.7647 0.2718 -0.2023 0.3814 0.8024 
 (6.74)*** (30.52)*** (14.38)*** (3.83)*** (-11.70)*** (3.41)***  
Panel B:  Second-stage Cross-sectional Regressions of Portfolio Returns on Factor Loadings
 
  
Model Intercept βRM-RF βSMB βHML βUMD βRCON Adj. R-square 
1 0.0250 -0.0184 0.0061 0.0051   0.4170 
 (2.60)*** (-2.42)** (2.21)** (1.95)*    
2 0.0282 -0.018 -0.0049 0.0091  0.0051 0.7566 
 (4.52)*** (-3.66)*** (1.82) (4.93)***  (3.42)***  
3 0.0263 -0.0214 0.0045 0.007 -0.009  0.4086 
 (2.68)*** (-2.53)** (1.33) (1.98)** (-0.61)   
4 0.0275 -0.0159 -0.0044 0.0079 0.0050 0.0055 0.7530 
  (4.36)*** (-2.90)*** (-1.59) (3.45)*** (-0.51) (3.49)***   
 
This table shows results of Fama-French 25 portfolio-level two-stage cross-sectional regressions for a sample over 
the 1986-2008 period. Panel A reports average factor loadings and adjusted R2 of the first-stage time-series 
regressions of monthly portfolio cash flow news adjusted excess returns against the three Fama–French factors, a 
momentum factor, and a conservatism factor RCON, using models (11) and (12) described in Section II. We 
construct RCON as the return on a zero-investment portfolio by buying the top 20 percent of firms and selling the 
bottom 20 percent of firms in terms of CON. Panel B reports estimated coefficients for the second-stage 
cross-sectional regressions of excess portfolio returns on portfolio factor loadings estimated from the first stage, 
according to models (13) and (14) in Section II. 
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TABLE 5. CON-Sorted Portfolio Analysis and Fama-MacBeth Regression of Cash Flow 
News Adjusted Excess Return on Conditional Conservatism, Information Risk, and 
Earnings Downside Risk  
Panel A:  Portfolio Analysis           
CON Portfolio IRisk ERisk 
1 0.0303 -0.0313 
2 0.0284 -0.0109 
3 0.031 -0.0108 
4 0.0341 -0.0063 
5 0.035 0.0254 
(5-1) 0.0047 0.0567 
t-statistic (24.11)*** (38.95)*** 
Panel B:  Fama-MacBeth Regressions with Industry Dummies 
Model CON Beta Size BM IRisk ERisk Avg. Adj. R-square 
1 0.0053 0.0036 -0.0004 0.0022 0.1522  0.0545 
 
(2.13)** (1.29) (-0.65) (2.92)*** (4.13)***  
 
2 0.0049 0.0021 -0.0012 0.0025  0.0152 0.0555 
 
(2.22)** (0.80) (-2.73)*** (3.63)***  (5.10)*** 
 
3 0.0041 0.0034 -0.0004 0.0024 0.1595 0.0145 0.0561 
  
(1.68)* (1.18) (-0.85) (3.01)*** (4.06)*** (4.32)*** 
  
 
This table presents estimation results for testing the information asymmetry and earnings downside risk effects on the 
conditional conservatism and equity costs relation. Panel A reports results from portfolio analyses for information 
asymmetry proxy IRisk and earnings downside risk measure ERisk. At the end of each month, firm-month observations are 
assigned into one of five portfolios based on a firm’s most recent CON known at least four or more months prior to the 
current date. Portfolio 1 (5) contains firms with the smallest (largest) CON. Average differences in IRisk and ERisk between 
the top and bottom portfolios are reported in row (5-1). The t-statistics for these differences are computed with a 
Newey-West (1987) correction. Panel B shows results for Fama-MacBeth regressions of future monthly cash flow news 
adjusted excess return on CON, IRisk, ERisk, and other firm characteristics (Beta, Size, BM). The reported estimates are 
time-series averages of the coefficients on CON from 276 monthly cross-sectional regressions. Reported t-statistics are 
calculated from Newey and West (1987) standard errors of these monthly averages. Panel B presents results estimated 
using models (15) to (17) as described in Section II. Other variable definitions are the same as for models (5) to (10). 
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TABLE 6. CON Portfolio Returns by Size, Book-to-Market, and Total Accruals 
Panel A:  Portfolio Returns Sorted by SIZE and CON 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High (5 – 1) t-statistic 
Small 0.0092 0.0115 0.0121 0.0143 0.0165 0.0073 (3.90)*** 
Large 0.0059 0.0063 0.0075 0.0075 0.0076 0.0018 (1.75)* 
Panel B:  Portfolio Returns Sorted by BM and CON 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High (5 – 1) t-statistic 
High 0.0095 0.0127 0.0142 0.0135 0.0173 0.0078 (5.27)*** 
Medium 0.0082 0.0084 0.0083 0.0101 0.0123 0.004 (2.65)*** 
Low 0.0048 0.0056 0.0068 0.0084 0.0083 0.0035 (1.85)* 
Panel C:  Portfolio Returns Sorted by TCA and CON 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High (5 – 1) t-statistic 
High 0.0061 0.0061 0.0084 0.0071 0.0093 0.0031 (1.76)* 
Medium 0.007 0.008 0.0087 0.0105 0.0119 0.0048 (3.79)*** 
Low 0.0101 0.0126 0.0126 0.0146 0.0162 0.0061 (3.40)*** 
 
This table compares average returns excluding cash flow news and risk-free rates for portfolios double sorted on 
conditional conservatism and Size, BM, or TCA, respectively. For each month during the period of January 1986 
through December 2008, firm-month observations are assigned into two size groups (Small, Large), or three BM 
groups (Low-bottom 30%, Medium-middle 40%, High-top 30%), or three TCA groups (Low-bottom 30%, 
Medium-middle 40%, High-top 30%), according to market capitalization, the book-to-market ratio, and total accrual 
defined in Section II. Five portfolios based on a firm’s most recent CON (with a minimum four-month lag) are 
constructed within each Size, BM, or TCA group, and the differences between the top and bottom portfolios are 
reported in the (5-1) column. The t-statistics for these differences are computed with Newey and West (1987) 
correction. 
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TABLE 7. CON Portfolio Analysis for Cash Flow News Adjusted Excess Return by Year 
Year 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High (5 – 1) t-statistic 
1986 -0.0011 0.0086 0.008 0.0015 0.0063 0.0074 (1.67)* 
1987 -0.0024 0 0.0038 0.0004 0.0039 0.0063 (1.07) 
1988 0.0191 0.0142 0.0186 0.0162 0.0161 -0.003 (-0.7) 
1989 0.0093 0.0076 0.0095 0.0087 0.0149 0.0056 (1.69)* 
1990 -0.0171 -0.0161 -0.0143 -0.0133 -0.0154 0.0017 (0.49) 
1991 0.0241 0.0294 0.0305 0.0382 0.0377 0.0136 (2.76)*** 
1992 0.0127 0.015 0.0129 0.0187 0.0203 0.0076 (1.85)* 
1993 0.0131 0.0137 0.0154 0.0145 0.0189 0.0058 (1.34) 
1994 0.0011 0.0032 0.001 0.0016 0.0021 0.001 (0.46) 
1995 0.0159 0.0182 0.0155 0.0227 0.03 0.0141 (4.41)*** 
1996 0.0111 0.014 0.0155 0.0192 0.0152 0.0041 (1.12) 
1997 0.0147 0.0181 0.0187 0.0178 0.0178 0.0031 (0.91) 
1998 -0.0035 -0.0005 0.0026 0.0025 0.0036 0.0071 (1.35) 
1999 0.0163 0.0186 0.018 0.0227 0.0345 0.0182 (2.20)** 
2000 0.0038 0.0037 0.0022 0.0101 0.0052 0.0014 (0.12) 
2001 0.0209 0.0208 0.0279 0.028 0.0398 0.0189 (2.44)** 
2002 -0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0075 -0.007 -0.0073 -0.0027 (-0.31) 
2003 0.0335 0.0394 0.046 0.0513 0.067 0.0335 (3.56)*** 
2004 0.018 0.0175 0.0172 0.0174 0.0131 -0.0049 (-0.78) 
2005 0.0099 0.0067 0.0073 0.008 0.0051 -0.0048 (-1.28) 
2006 0.013 0.0128 0.0138 0.0103 0.0119 -0.001 (-0.20) 
2007 0.0017 0.0004 -0.0046 0.002 -0.0034 -0.0051 (-1.44) 
2008 -0.0385 -0.0381 -0.0381 -0.0441 -0.0454 -0.0069 (-1.48) 
 
This table presents annual average returns excluding cash flow news and risk-free rates across five portfolios of 
conditional conservatism (CON) for each year from 1986 to 2008. For each month, firm-month observations are 
assigned into five portfolios based on a firm’s most recent CON (with a minimum four-month lag). Portfolio 1 (5) 
contains firms with the smallest (largest) CON. Then excess returns for portfolio 1 to 5 stocks are averaged, and the 
average differences between the top and bottom portfolios are reported in the column (5-1) by year. The t-statistics 
for these differences are computed with Newey and West (1987) correction. 
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TABLE 8. SOX and Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Cash Flow News Adjusted Excess Return on Conditional 
Conservatism and Firm Characteristics with Industry Dummies 
Panel A:  Fama-MacBeth Regressions in the Pre-SOX Period before 2002 (1986.01-2001.12)       
Model CON Beta Size BM Momentum TCA Acc Low-Priced IRisk ERisk Ave. Adj. R-square 
1 0.0124          0.0334 
 (3.87)***           
2 0.0095 0.0032 -0.0011 0.0028       0.0505 
 (3.62)*** (1.10) (-1.80)* (3.20)***        
3 0.0094 0.0023 -0.0013 0.0027 0.003      0.0554 
 (3.63)*** (0.89) (-2.02)** (3.17)*** (1.72)*       
4 0.0088 0.0035 -0.0012 0.0022  -0.0198     0.0515 
 (3.36)*** (1.19) (-1.82)* (2.55)**  (-6.02)***      
5 0.0124 0.0032 -0.002 0.0029   0.023 -0.0154   0.0611 
 (5.06)*** (1.15) (-3.64)*** (3.51)***   (1.56) (-6.72)***    
6 0.0086 0.0046 -0.0002 0.0026     0.0816  0.0499 
 (2.93)*** (1.45) (-0.31) (2.75)***     (3.55)***   
7 0.0082 0.0028 -0.0011 0.0028      0.0207 0.0523 
 (3.24)*** (0.92) (-1.80)* (3.14)***      (5.84)***  
8 0.0105 0.0061 -0.0013 0.0017 0.0004 -0.0207 0.0115 -0.0206 0.1434 0.0163 0.0684 
 (3.44)*** (2.18)** (-1.94)* (1.69)* (0.20) (-4.80)*** (0.72) (-9.43)*** (5.47)*** (3.57)***  
Panel B:  Fama-MacBeth Regressions in the Post-SOX Period after 2003 (2004.01-2008.12)       
Model CON Beta Size BM Momentum TCA Acc Low-Priced IRisk ERisk Ave. Adj. R-square 
1 -0.0073          0.0449 
 (-1.31)           
2 -0.0062 -0.0046 -0.0005 0.0011       0.0559 
 (-1.60) (-1.14) (-0.91) (0.96)        
3 -0.0063 -0.0045 -0.0007 0.0012 -0.0009      0.0604 
 (-1.58) (-1.18) (-1.11) (1.05) (-0.31)       
4 -0.0058 -0.0043 -0.0006 0.0011  -0.0012     0.0565 
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 (-1.55) (-1.06) (-0.95) (0.99)  (-0.28)      
5 0.0046 -0.0025 -0.0022 0.001   -0.0145 -0.0212   0.0599 
 (-1.19) (-0.63) (-4.35)*** (0.86)   (-1.51) (-7.57)***    
6 -0.0068 -0.0043 0.0003 0.0007     0.3126  0.0595 
 (-1.71)* (-1.09) (-0.57) (0.62)     (2.33)**   
7 -0.0057 -0.0046 -0.0007 0.001      -0.0002 0.0572 
 (-1.51) (-1.14) (-1.17) (0.83)      (-0.04)  
8 0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0057 -0.0015 -0.006 -0.0258 0.6457 0.0059 0.0714 
  (-0.71) (-0.38) (-0.73) (0.60) (-2.02)** (-0.35) (-0.61) (-8.98)*** (4.36)*** (-0.89)   
 
     This table presents estimation results for Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly cash flow news adjusted excess return on conditional conservatism 
(CON), total accruals (TCA), accrual quality (Acc) (along with a low-priced return indicator variable Low-Priced), information asymmetry (IRisk), 
earnings downside risk (ERisk), and firm characteristics including Beta, Size, and BM, plus controls for dummies for Fama and French (1997) 
industries. Panel A reports average regression coefficients for the period of January 1986 to December 2001, a period before SOX; Panel B reports 
average coefficients for the period of January 2004 to December 2008, a period after SOX. 
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FIGURE 1. Mean Differences in Cash Flow News Adjusted Excess Return  
for CON-Sorted Hedging Portfolios by Year 
 
 
This figure presents average cash flow news adjusted excess returns for hedging portfolios sorted by conditional 
conservatism (CON) for each year over the period of January 1986 to December 2008. For each month, firm-month 
observations are assigned to five portfolios based on a firm’s most recent CON (with a minimum four-month lag). 
Depicted are average differences in mean cash flow news adjusted excess returns between the top and bottom 
quintile portfolios sorted by CON. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 regulations were implemented in 2003-2004. 
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